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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(g) (1987) the Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Matter. This appeal is 
from a six (6) day bench trial. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Carleen (Neilson) Collram presents the following issues 
in this appeal: 
1. Did the Trial Court err when lit concluded as a mat-
ter of law that the Prenuptial Agreement was void as violative of 
the public policy of this State? 
2. Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a mat-
ter of law that the consideration for the Prenuptial Agreement 
was a "normal marital relationship;" that the consideration 
failed; and therefore, that the Prenuptial Agreement was void? 
3. Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a mat-
ter of law that the Court had the equitable power to distribute 
property contrary to the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement? 
4. Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a mat-
ter of law that the Domestic Relations Commissioner's Report and 
Recommendation was a binding Order of the Cburt? 
5. Did the Trial Court err when it ordered the defen-
dant to pay her own attorney's fees out of the assets awarded to 
her upon divorce and determine the amount that she should pay? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE| 
Plaintiff Alfred Neilson brought this action against 
defendant Carleen (Neilson) Collram to annul their marriage and 
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to avoid a prenuptial agreement (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Prenuptial Agreement" or "Agreement") they entered into prior to 
marriage. A copy is attached as Addendum "A." Plaintiff alleged 
that defendant fraudulently induced him to marry her; and, that 
she fraudulently induced him to execute the Prenuptial Agreement. 
(R. 2-18) A six (6) day bench trial was held. During the trial, 
the Trial Court heard extensive evidence from both parties. 
After trial, the Trial Court made its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. (R. 385-388, 389-398) 
The Trial Court specifically found that plaintiff was 
not fraudulently induced to enter into the marriage; and, that he 
was not fraudulently induced to enter into the Prenuptial Agree-
ment. (R. 394) It also found that the parties did not enter 
into the Prenuptial Agreement under fraud, duress or with undue 
influence upon either of them. (R. 394) The Trial Court found 
that plaintiff's attorney prepared the Prenuptial Agreement in 
accord with plaintiff's wishes; and, that he acted as attorney 
for both parties in the drafting and execution of the Agreement. 
(R. 394) 
The Trial Court found that the "Prenuptial Agreement is 
void and against this State's public policy for the reason that 
it encourages conduct designed to facilitate the break up of a 
marital relationship." (R. 396) The Court further found that 
"the consideration for the [Prenuptial Agreement] itself, to wit, 
a normal marital relationship, failed." (R. 394) Consequently, 
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the Trial Court held the Prenuptial Agreement void as violative 
of public policy. (R. 396-7) 
The Trial Court made factual findings as to the marital 
assets; and, the income and assets of the parties. It also made 
the findings necessary to enter a Decree of Divorce. 
(R. 389-398) 
The Trial Court also concluded as a matter of law that 
it had the "equitable power to divide all property, including the 
property encompassed within the Prenuptial Agreement, on the 
grounds of equity and justice." It concluded that it had these 
powers even if the Prenuptial Agreement was not declared void as 
violative of public policy. However, the Ttial Court expressed 
that it did not exercise these powers as a basis for its deci-
sion. (R. 396-7) 
The Trial Court denied plaintifff$ petition for annul-
ment. (R. 396) Instead, it awarded plaintiff a divorce based 
upon irreconcilable differences and mental truelty. (R. 396) 
The Trial Court then awarded and divided the property accumulated 
during the marriage. (R. 397-8) The Trial Court ordered defen-
dant to pay her own attorneys $20,000.00 in attorneys' fees out 
of the property it awarded to her. (R. 397) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 6, 1986, plaintiff contacted his attor-
ney, David E. Salisbury, and had him draft the Prenuptial Agree-
ment. As justification for his request, plaintiff expressed that 
he wanted to protect his assets. Plaintiff told Mr. Salisbury 
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the specific provisions he wanted included for the distribution 
of his stock. Plaintiff's attorney drafted the Prenuptial Agree-
ment. Defendant reviewed the Agreement, asked Mr. Salisbury 
questions concerning it, and asked two of her friends, who are 
both attorneys, their opinion of the Prenuptial Agreement. 
(Trial Trans. 382-387) Thereafter, defendant went to Mr. 
Salisbury's office and suggested some changes to the Agreement. 
(Trial Trans. 212-220) Mr. Salisbury acted as the attorney for 
both plaintiff and defendant. (R. 391) 
2. On February 25, 1986, plaintiff and defendant met 
in Mr. Salisbury's office, discussed the provisions, suggested 
changes and agreed upon the provisions of the Prenuptial Agree-
ment. (Trial Trans. 212-220) At that time, both parties signed 
the Agreement in the presence of Mr. Salisbury. (R. 391) 
3. At the time the Prenuptial Agreement was signed, 
plaintiff was 65 years old. He graduated from college and law 
school. He has been a businessman all of his life. (Trial 
Trans. 114-5) Defendant was 31 years old. She graduated from 
the University of Utah with a degree in financing and she had 
pursued a career in banking. (R. 393) 
4. On July 17, 1986, plaintiff filed his complaint. 
(R. 2) 
5. On August 17, 1986, defendant petitioned for tempo-
rary support. (R. 25-28) 
6. On September 2, 1986, the Commissioner of Domestic 
Relations recommended denial of the motion for temporary support; 
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and, recommended that defendant not sell any of the stock 
acquired pursuant to the Prenuptial Agreement. (R. 75, 88) 
7. On September 5, 1986, defendant timely objected to 
the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation. (R. 78-79) Prior 
to the Trial Court's hearing and disposition of the motion for 
temporary support, defendant sold 372 shares of the 1,272 shares 
of stock that she had received at trial. She testified that she 
had had no support from plaintiff since July 19, 1986 and that 
the sale of stock was necessary for her temporary support. 
(R. 217; Trial Trans. 446-48) 
8. On January 9, 1987, plaintiff petitioned the Trial 
Court to hold defendant in contempt for her action. (R. 198) 
9. On January 23, 1987, the Court heard plaintiff's 
motion and defendant's objections. It held defendant in contempt 
as violative of the Commissioner's "order;" and, upheld the 
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation over defendant's objec-
tions. (R. 217) 
10. Beginning June 29, 1987 and ending July 30, 1987, 
the Trial Court heard six (6) days of testimony. (R. 334-6, 
339-42) 
11. On July 30, 1987, the Trial Court gave its ruling 
from the bench. It instructed plaintiff's counsel to prepare 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce. 
(R. 342) 
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12. The Trial Court found that defendant did not 
fraudulently induce plaintiff to marry her and it denied 
plaintifffs claim for annulment. (R. 394, 396) 
13. The Trial Court used its claimed equitable powers 
to treat plaintiff's Complaint as a complaint for divorce and 
awarded to plaintiff a decree on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences and mental cruelty. (R. 396) 
14. The Trial Court also found that defendant did not 
fraudulently induce plaintiff to enter into the Prenuptial Agree-
ment. (R. 394) 
15. The Trial Court found and concluded the Prenuptial 
Agreement violated the State's public policy; and therefore, it 
held the Agreement was void. It violated public policy according 
to the Trial Court because it facilitated divorce. The Trial 
Court failed to specify any provision that facilitated divorce. 
It also failed to articulate what public policy was harmed by the 
Agreement. (R. 396) 
16. The Trial Court also found that the consideration 
for the Prenuptial Agreement failed. The Trial Court based its 
decision on the ground that the consideration for the Agreement 
was a "normal marital relationship;" and, that no such relation-
ship existed. (R. 394) 
17. The Trial Court concluded as a matter of law that 
it had the equitable powers to rewrite the Agreement and make it 
"fair." Although, the Court did not exercise this power as a 
basis for its final decision. (R. 396) 
-6-
18. On October 29, 1987, the Trial Court heard 
defendant's objections to plaintiff's Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce. (R. 344) 
19. On December 19, 1987, the Trial Court entered 
judgment. (R. 385-388) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Almost all United States jurisdictions recognize the 
validity of prenuptial agreements that divide property upon 
divorce. Those jurisdictions recognize that those types of 
prenuptial agreements do not violate public policy. 
In this case, the Trial Court erred when it concluded 
that the Prenuptial Agreement between the parties violated public 
policy. While the Prenuptial Agreement may have facilitated 
property division in the event of a divorce, it did not encourage 
or promote divorce. Therefore, the Prenuptial Agreement passed 
the test of public policy. 
The Trial Court erred when it concluded that the con-
sideration for the Prenuptial Agreement failed. The Trial Court 
incorrectly interpreted the Prenuptial Agreement's consideration 
as requiring a "normal marital relationship." Instead, the 
Agreement called for the parties to marry and consummate that 
marriage as the consideration for the Agreement. 
This Court should prohibit a trial court from making an 
inquiry into the "fairness" of a prenuptial agreement. Instead, 
a Utah trial court should follow the rule that it will view a 
prenuptial agreement as objectively as any other contract. 
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The Trial Court erred in holding that the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner's recommendation was a binding Order, 
before the Trial Court formally ruled on defendant's objections 
to the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, Both due pro-
cess considerations and statutory construction require that a 
trial court make its own determination as to the Commissioner's 
recommendation before it becomes a binding Order. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it ordered 
defendant to pay her own attorneys' fees out of the property 
awarded to her upon divorce. The Trial Court abused its discre-
tion because it ordered her to pay those fees out of her own 
funds. It also erred when it set the specific sum she was to pay 
her own attorneys. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF 
THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT. 
A. Standard of Review 
Plaintiff brought this action in both equity and law. 
The equitable action sought to annul his marriage. See Burnett 
v. Burnett, 192 Kan. 247, 387 P.2d 195 (1963) (an action for 
annulment is an equitable proceeding). The equitable and legal 
action sought to void the Prenuptial Agreement and to require 
defendant to return shares of stock to plaintiff. 
In this appeal, defendant attacks the Trial Court's 
Conclusions of Law as to the Agreement, not its specific Findings 
of Fact. Since defendant appeals the Trial Court's legal 
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conclusions regarding the Agreement, this Court should review the 
case at law. And consequently, it should review the case de 
novo. See So. Oregon Production Ass'n v. Patridqe, 71 Or. App. 
53 P.2d 135 (1984) (reviewing case that began in equity as a case 
at law because only legal issues were presented). 
When this Court reviews the Trial Court's Conclusions 
of Law, it should not defer to the Trial Court's decision. 
Instead, it must review the correctness of the Trial Court's 
decision. See Russell v. Erickson Landscaping, 711 P.2d 250 
(Utah 1985) (the trial court's legal conclusions are subject to 
review for their correctness); Scharf v. BMG Construction, 700 
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) (stating the standard). And furthermore, 
it must review the Prenuptial Agreement's language as a question 
of law, not fact. Therefore, this Court is free to render its 
own, independent, interpretation of the Agreement's terms. See 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) (stating the 
standard). 
However, this Court must defer to the Trial Court's 
factual findings. This deference applies to actions in equity, 
see Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 
918 (Utah 1982) (in appeals from equity, the court defers to the 
Trial Court's factual findings and reverses those findings only 
when the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's 
findings); and, to actions at law, see Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070 
(stating these principles apply to actions at law); Russell, 711 
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P.2d at 252 (noting that an appeals court should defer to the 
finder of fact). 
B. Overview of the Validity Of Prenuptial Agreements, 
Virtually every United States jurisdiction recognizes 
the validity of prenuptial agreements. Generally, prenuptial 
agreements do not violate public policy per se. See Brooks v. 
Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1986) (the nationwide trend recog-
nizes the validity of prenuptial agreements); Gant v, Gant, 329 
S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985) (endorsing the growing acceptance of 
prenuptial agreements and their validity). 
2 
In a complete turnabout from the common law, many 
states now favor prenuptial agreements as a matter of public pol-
icy. See, e,q,, Spector v, Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 
176 (1972) (Arizona's public policy favors prenuptial agree-
ments); Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W,2d 567 (Minn, 1980) (Minnesota 
law favors prenuptial agreements). The modern trend that favors 
prenuptial agreements is expressed by the Uniform Prenuptial 
Agreement Act ("UPAA"). Under the UPAA, written prenuptial 
agreements are presumed valid if signed by both parties. 
1 The attached addendum cites cases from across the United 
States that recognize the validity of prenuptial agreements. 
See Addendum "B." 
2 Prior to 1970, prenuptial agreements that governed property 
distribution upon divorce were considered invalid by many 
jurisdictions as contrary to public policy. See Brooks, 733 
P.2d at 1048-49 (explaining the common law rule); Gant, 289 
S.E.2d at 112 (noting public policy of thirty (30) years ago 
prohibited prenuptial agreements that disposed of property 
upon divorce). 
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This Court has addressed the issue of the validity of 
prenuptial agreements. This Court has noted, in dictum, that 
prenuptial agreements are generally valid. See Huck v. Huck, 734 
P.2d 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1986) (noting that prenuptial agreements 
are generally valid if not based on fraud, coercion or 
non-disclosure). This Court reaffirmed the Huck dictum in Berman 
v. Berman, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Feb. 1, 1988). 
Accordingly, this Court should adopt the nationwide 
rule that prenuptial agreements are valid and do not violate pub-
lic policy per se. 
II. THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY. 
A. Introduction 
The Trial Court concluded the Prenuptial Agreement was 
3 
void as violative of this State's public policy. According to 
the Trial Court, the Prenuptial Agreement contained language that 
"facilitated11 divorce. (R. 396) As defendant will demonstrate, 
the Trial Court erred. 
B. Applicable Legal Standard 
While no Utah case directly addresses this issue, sev-
eral jurisdictions deal with it squarely, most notably, Califor-
nia. Prenuptial agreements offend public policy only insofar as 
3 The Trial Court did not invalidate the Prenuptial Agreement 
on any specific grounds other than public policy. The Trial 
Court specifically found and held that the Prenuptial Agree-
ment was not fraudulently induced. The Trial Court also 
found that neither party entered into the Agreement as a 
result of coercion or duress. (R. 394) 
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the agreement's language "encourages" or "promotes" divorce. 
However, a prenuptial agreement that simply "facilitates" divorce 
does not violate public policy: 
In a literal sense, any contract which delim-
its the property rights of the spouses might 
"facilitate" dissolution by making possible a 
shorter and less expensive dissolution hear-
ing. But public property does not render 
property agreements unenforceable merely 
because such agreement simplifies the divi-
sion of marital property; it is only when the 
agreement encourages or promotes dissolution 
that it offends the public policy to foster 
and protect marriage. 
Marriage of Dawley, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 17 Cal. 3rd. 342, 551 P.2d 
323 (Cal. 1976). 
While courts fail to articulate guidelines as to what 
type of language "promotes" or "encourages" dissolution, language 
that contemplates divorce passes public policy muster. See Mar-
riage of Dawley, 551 P.2d at 325. Simply put, public policy is 
not offended when parties enter into a prenuptial agreement with 
the thought that the marriage may end in divorce. See Marriage 
of Dawley, 351 P.2d at 328-329. 
C. The Trial Court Erred 
The standard of review calls for this Court to freely 
and independently review the Prenuptial Agreement's language, and 
to determine: whether, as a matter of law, the Prenuptial Agree-
ment promotes divorce; and, whether, as a matter of law, the 
Prenuptial Agreement violates public policy. However, this Court 
should defer to the Trial Court's factual findings as to the 
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Agreement. The Trial Court found that there was no fraud, coer-
cion and duress in entering into the Agreement. (R. 394) 
In this case, the Trial Court concluded that the 
Prenuptial Agreement facilitated divorce. The Trial Court 
explicitly noted and carefully concluded that the Agreement did 
not encourage or promote divorce. The Trial Court ruled specifi-
cally on the language of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. It had the choice between words "encouraged" and 
4 . . 
"facilitates." The Trial Court carefully chose "facilitates;" 
and, one can assume that it deliberately held the Agreement 
facilitated, but did not encourage divorce. The Trial Court also 
failed to point to any specific language of the Prenuptial Agree-
ment that facilitated divorce. 
This Court should defer to the Trial Court's factual 
findings that the Agreement only facilitated divorce and deter-
mine whether the Trial Court correctly applied the facts to the 
law. Under the California standard, it did not. The Trial Court 
erred by holding that a prenuptial agreement that facilitates 
divorce violates public policy. As a matter of law, a prenuptial 
agreement that facilitates, but does not encourage, divorce 
4 The Trial Court faced Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. During 
the hearing, the Trial Court rejected the word "encouraged." 
While this hearing was reported, the court reporter, Ernie 
Sanchez, has moved from Utah and took the transcript with 
him; and therefore, it is not available. 
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passes the tests of public policy. Consequently, the Trial 
Court's incorrect legal conclusion requires reversal. 
If this Court decides not to defer to the Trial Court's 
factual findings, it must independently determine whether the 
Agreement's language encourages divorce. The Prenuptial 
Agreement's language does not encourage or promote divorce. The 
Prenuptial Agreement actually encourages and promotes marital 
success between the parties. It requires that each party work to 
5 . . 
make the marriage succeed. The only provisions of the 
Prenuptial Agreement that contemplate divorce are paragraphs 8 
and 9. The other provisions of the Prenuptial Agreement do not 
mention divorce. 
Paragraph 8 explains the impact of divorce on the par-
ties' wills executed under the Agreement. In effect, paragraph 8 
simply allows the party that does not initiate divorce to change 
his or her will. The party that initiates divorce must keep his 
or her will in accord with the Agreement. See Prenuptial Agree-
ment 11 8. Therefore, on its face, paragraph 8 does not violate 
public policy because it confers no benefit on the party that 
initiates divorce. 
Paragraph 9 sets out a property distribution schedule 
during marriage; and, distributes additional property in the 
event of divorce. Paragraph 9's language creates an economic 
5 Defendant testified that she wanted the parties to work at 
making the marriage successful. (Trial Trans. 468-70) 
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disincentive for plaintiff to initiate a divorce action. See 
Prenuptial Agreement f 9. In that event, plaintiff would forfeit 
one-half (1/2) of his stock. That prospect, viewed in light of 
common sense and fiscal prudence, prevents anyone from reasonably 
contending that the Prenuptial Agreement encourages or encouraged 
plaintiff to seek a divorce. On the contrary, an objective exam-
ination of the provision's language leads one to conclude that it 
encourages plaintiff to stay married, to work at making the mar-
riage a success and to avoid divorce. 
The same argument applies equally to defendant. Defen-
dant gains no advantage under the Agreement's terms that can be 
said to promote divorce. Indeed, the Agreement promotes marriage 
because defendant receives more in the way of property the longer 
she stays married. On the other hand, defendant receives no more 
for each year of marriage than she would probably receive by a 
Utah court's equitable distribution, in absence of the Agreement. 
The entire thrust of the Prenuptial Agreement encour-
ages and promotes marriage by requiring the parties to work for a 
successful marriage. The Prenuptial Agreement facilitates 
divorce in the sense that it makes property division easier and 
definite upon divorce; and thereby, decreases litigation. How-
ever, it has a harsher effect on the party who initiates divorce. 
It is difficult to image that a trial court would be harsher on 
plaintiff if he initiated divorce or on defendant if she did the 
same, then the parties are treated under the Agreement's terms. 
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And, in this case, the Trial Court treated plaintiff more favor-
ably than the Agreement mandated, 
A prenuptial agreement that distributes property in a 
seemingly uneven manner does not encourage divorce or violate 
public policy. On the contrary, the generally accepted view 
enforces prenuptial agreements, which are otherwise valid, 
regardless of the distribution of assets in the event of divorce. 
See Matter of Estate of Moss, 200 Nev. 215, 263 N.W.2d 98 (1978) 
(holding that an apparently disproportionate provision for a wife 
or a disparity between what she is to receive and the value of 
the husband's property does not, in and of itself, afford a basis 
for voiding a prenuptial agreement); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 
728 (Colo. 1982) (holding that a prenuptial agreement is enforce-
able even if it disproportionately divides the property); Matter 
of Marriage of Bacchus, 78 Or. App. 663, 717 P.2d 654, reh'q 
denied, 722 P.2d 737, 301 Or. 338 (1986) (holding that a 
prenuptial agreement was valid when the wife was aware of the 
nature of the husband's estate at the time she signed the 
prenuptial agreement; understood the consequences of the agree-
ment; and, understood the distribution of assets upon divorce). 
Even if Paragraph 9 treats plaintiff harshly upon initiating 
divorce, that alone does not invalidate the Agreement on the 
grounds of public policy. The Trial Court should not substitute 
its own opinions for the contractual provisions of the parties. 
The Prenuptial Agreement promotes marriage, not 
divorce. The agreed upon property divisions in the event of 
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divorce do not violate public policy. The Agreement passes pub-
lic policy muster and should be upheld as valid. Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's conclusion 
that the Prenuptial Agreement violates this State's public 
policy. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERA-
TION FOR THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT FAILED. 
A. Introduction 
The Trial Court's interpretation of the Prenuptial 
Agreement's language led it to conclude that the Agreement's con-
sideration failed. (R. 394) The Trial Court erred. 
B. Applicable Legal Standard 
Consideration fails "whenever one who has either given 
or promised to give some performance fails without his fault to 
receive in some material respect the agreed exchange for that 
performance." See Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984) 
(stating the rule). This rule applies to prenuptial agreements 
as well as any other contract. See Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d at 
112 (general contract law governs prenuptial agreements). 
C. The Trial Court Erred 
The Trial Court's error as to failed consideration was 
not factually based. Instead, the Trial Court misinterpreted the 
Agreement's language, thus this Court need not defer to the Trial 
Court, and it may independently review the Agreement's language. 
The Prenuptial Agreement contains two forms of consid-
eration. The first form of consideration is mutual promises to 
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marry. See Prenuptial Agreement, p. 1. The second form of con-
sideration is other good and valuable consideration. Id. This 
second form includes mutual waivers of rights because both par-
ties, through signing the Agreement, waived their property rights 
under this State's divorce statutes. Indeed, the Prenuptial 
Agreement's purpose is to avoid court enforced property division 
under the equitable distribution rules. Both forms constitute 
adequate and valuable consideration. See Williams v. Williams, 
569 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978) (mutual promises to marriage, 
subsequently performed, provide valuable consideration for a 
prenuptial agreement); Friendlander v. Friendlander, 80 Wash. 2d 
293, 494 P.2d 208 (Wash. 1972) (marriage is not only valuable 
consideration, but it is consideration of the highest value); 
Herman v. Gotz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969) (mutual waivers 
of rights constitute adequate consideration for a prenuptial 
agreement). 
The first form of consideration, mutual promises of 
marriage, did not fail. The Trial Court erred when it inter-
preted the Agreement's language as calling for a "normal marital 
relationship." No such term exists in the Agreement. The Trial 
Court's reliance on its own determination that the Agreement's 
consideration was a "normal marital relationship" has no founda-
tion at law. Legally, the Trial Court should have determined 
whether the marriage was legally contracted and consummated, 
because that was the consideration for the Agreement. What the 
Trial Court may consider as a "normal marital relationship" is 
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irrelevant. It was never part of the consideration contracted by 
the parties. See Berman v. Berman, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. at 54 
(prenuptial agreements are construed and treated the same as con-
tracts in general). See also Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d at 115 
(judges should not rewrite prenuptial agreements to conform to 
their liking). 
The Prenuptial Agreement does not call for a "normal 
marital relationship11 as the Agreement's consideration. The 
Prenuptial Agreement's language specifies the consideration as 
"each party's promise of marriage." See Prenuptial Agreement, 
p. 1. On March 1, 1986, the promises to marry were kept, the 
parties were married, the marriage was consummated, and the con-
sideration was exchanged. Therefore, the consideration did not 
fail. 
The Trial Court based its conclusion regarding the 
failed consideration on its, and plaintiff's, views as to what 
constitutes a "normal marital relationship." The Trial Court's 
conclusion was improperly subjective instead of legal. Simply 
put, what constitutes a normal marital relationship? How is it 
defined? And how does it compare to an abnormal marital rela-
tionship? Every judge may have a different standard of what is 
normal. Such a standard destroys the parties' ability to con-
tract. For these reasons, courts reject this subjective approach 
as a basis to invalidate prenuptial agreements. See Marriage of 
Dawley, 551 P.2d at 329 ("[a] rule measuring the validity of all 
prenuptial agreements by [the] subjective contemplation of the 
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parties hazards the validity of all prenuptial agreements"). 
Consequently, the Trial Court applied an inappropriate standard 
to adjudicate the consideration of the Agreement. 
As noted above, mutual waivers of property rights also 
constitutes consideration. The Prenuptial Agreement contains 
such a waiver. Therefore, the Prenuptial Agreement stands inde-
pendently on the basis of that consideration. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Trial 
Court's conclusion as to failed consideration. The Trial Court 
misread and misinterpreted the Prenuptial Agreement's language as 
to consideration. The Prenuptial Agreement's language called for 
the consideration of mutual promises to marry. The parties were 
married and it was consummated. The consideration was not, as 
the Trial Court concluded, a "normal marital relationship;" and, 
a court should not rewrite a prenuptial agreement to conform to 
its own moral and social subjective tests of normalcy. A subjec-
tive standard such as "normal marital relationship" reeks havoc 
on all prenuptial agreements, thus making them vulnerable to the 
"wisdom" or personal views of the trial court. Furthermore, the 
Prenuptial Agreement's validity stands as an independent form of 
consideration, the mutual waiver of property rights. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE PERIMETERS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S EQUITABLE POWER WHEN A TRIAL COURT REVIEWS A 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT. 
A* Introduction 
The Trial Court concluded that it had the equitable 
power to restructure the Agreement's terms to make it fair or 
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more just. In effect, the Trial Court held that even if other-
wise valid at law, it could rewrite or refuse to enforce a 
prenuptial agreement as part of its equitable power. (R. 396) 
While the Trial Court reserved applying its conclusion to this 
case, this conclusion must be addressed. As defendant will dem-
onstrate, the Trial Court misinterpreted its equitable and legal 
powers; or alternatively, it should not have such equitable 
powers. 
B. Applicable Legal Standard 
1. Any Cases Supporting The Trial Court's Theory Are 
Based On Outmoded Thinking. 
Some Utah cases lend credence to the Trial Court's 
interpretation of its equitable powers. See Penrose v. Penrose, 
656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982) (upholding prenuptial agreement after 
inquiring into its fairness); Mathie v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 
363 P.2d 779 (1961) (holding trial court properly used "fairness 
review" for coverture agreement). 
While these cases buttress the Trial Court's conclu-
sion, they must be viewed in context. Only one case talks about 
the "fairness review" in the context of a prenuptial agreement. 
See Penrose, 656 at 1018. Penrose does not define what criteria 
the court must use when determining fairness. 
The other cases deal with other contracts relating to 
marriage and property division. Mathie is not directly on point 
as to a court's equitable powers in the prenuptial agreement's 
context because no prenuptial agreement was at issue. The Mathie 
-21-
case specifically noted that the coverture agreement did not con-
template the future divorce; and, did not dispose of property in 
the event of a divorce. See Mathie, 363 P.2d at 783. The Mathie 
case suffers from outmoded thinking about marriage; the equality 
of the parties to marriage; the parties' bargaining power; and, 
the parties1 right to freely contract. 
2. The Appropriate Standard Of Review For Prenuptial 
Agreements. 
Reviewing prenuptial agreements for "fairness" allows 
the Trial Court to apply a vague and subjective standard. One 
court accurately summarized the inherent problems of the "fair-
ness review" standard in the prenuptial agreement context: 
The term "fairf" without some fur-
ther elaboration, gives no guideline whatso-
ever concerning which agreements will be 
binding and which agreements will be struck 
down. Furthermore, candor compels us to 
raise to a conscience level the fact, as in 
this case, prenuptial agreements will almost 
always be entered into between people with 
property or an income potential to protect on 
one side and people who are impecunions on 
the other. Measuring an agreement by an 
undefined judicial standard of fairness is an 
invitation to the very wealth distribution 
that these agreements are designed to 
prevent. 
Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114 (W. Va. 1985). The fairness 
review standard justifies itself by arguing that the parties 
often have unequal bargaining power. This problem, however, 
always arises to some extent with any contractual relationship. 
And if this standard applied across the board, all contracts 
between rich and poor, smart and not-so-smart could be 
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invalidated by a court. See Gant v. Ganty 329 S.E.2d at 114 
(stating these principals). It must be remembered that these 
parties were college graduates. Plaintiff was educated at law 
and wrote and entered contracts during his lengthy business 
carreer. The parties knew and understood the binding effect of 
contracts. 
This "fairness" standard of review does not exist any-
where else in contract law. In the ordinary contract case, Utah 
courts are prohibited from such intervention. Utah law specifi-
cally prohibits a court from using its equitable powers in the 
fashion espoused by the Trial Court. Simply put, a Utah trial 
court cannot rewrite a contract to make it "fair." A trial 
court's discretionary boundaries are narrowly drawn, and do not 
entitle a court to restructure the contract according to that 
court's desires. See Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549 
(Utah 1982) (stating these principles and prohibitions). 
The West Virginia Court also explained what courts mean 
when they refer to the fairness review standard: 
The cases that discuss prenuptial 
agreements in other jurisdictions lead to the 
conclusion that when courts talk about "fair-
ness" in the setting of a prenuptial agree-
ment, they are usually not talking about an 
entirely subjective, open-ended concept that 
allows judges to renegotiate contracts and 
substitute their own judgment for the agree-
ment of the parties. Rather, what other 
courts are really concerned about is 
"foreseeability." 
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Gant v, Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114-15 (W. Va. 1985), The West 
Virginia court then explained the proper standard of review for 
prenuptial agreements: 
West Virginia courts will not eval-
uate the substance of fairness of prenuptial 
agreements; most prenuptial agreements are 
designed to preserve the property interest of 
the stronger party. Nonetheless, prenuptial 
agreements will be enforced in their explicit 
terms only to the extent the circumstances at 
the time the marriage ends are roughly what 
the parties foresaw at the time they entered 
into the prenuptial agreement. 
Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 1985). 
Applying the West Virginia review standard mandates 
upholding and enforcing the Prenuptial Agreement as written. In 
this case, nothing was unforeseen. Divorce was not unforeseen. 
On the contrary, the Prenuptial Agreement addresses that sce-
nario. And consequently, the Prenuptial Agreement passes the 
West Virginia review standard. 
Accordingly, this Court should adopt the West Virginia 
review standard. It promotes the validity of prenuptial agree-
ments; and, the parties' purposes for entering into such a con-
tract. It more accurately reflects the general contract law of 
this state. At the same time, the West Virginia standard pro-
tects the parties from unforeseen contingencies. It most deli-
cately balances social concerns with the parties' contractual 
intentions. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION WAS A BINDING ORDER. 
A. Introduction 
On August 17, 1986, defendant petitioned the Court, 
through the procedure of the Domestic Relations Commissioner (the 
"Commissioner"), for temporary support and other matters. On 
September 2, 1985, the Commissioner heard defendant's Motion and 
issued a recommendation. The Recommendation denied defendant's 
Motion. The Commissioner also recommended that defendant not 
sale any of the stock in her possession. 
On September 5, 1986, defendant objected to the 
Commissioner's Recommendation. Prior to the time the Trial Court 
heard defendant's objection, but after the Recommendation and 
after defendant had formally objected, defendant sold 372 shares 
of her 1,292 shares of Texas Eastern Stock. On January 7, 1987, 
plaintiff moved the Trial Court for an Order to Show Cause to 
hold defendant in contempt for her sale of the Texas Eastern 
shares. 
On January 23, 1987, the Trial Court heard defendant's 
objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation. It also heard 
plaintiff's Motion to hold defendant in contempt. The Trial 
Court denied defendant's objections and upheld the Commissioner's 
Recommendation. The Trial Court also held that defendant was in 
6 Shortly after the wedding, defendant had received 1272 
shares of Texas Eastern Corporation Stock pursuant to Para-
graph 9 of the Prenuptial Agreement. 
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contempt on the grounds that she had violated an Order of the 
Court when she sold the shares of stock; and, that the 
Commissioner's Recommendation was as binding upon her as if it 
were an Order of the Court. The Trial Court ordered defendant to 
return the unsold shares to her attorney. It also threatened to 
default her answer in the event she was found in contempt again. 
As defendant will demonstrate, the Trial Court erred. 
B. Applicable Legal Standard 
Utah law establishes the Commissioner's jurisdiction, 
duties and authority. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-4.2, 4.3 & 4.4 
(1985). The Commissioner's jurisdiction is limited to making 
recommendations. See Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-4.4(a) & (b) (1985) 
(defining the role of the Commissioner as making recommendations 
to the trial court). If a party objects to the recommendation, 
the objection goes to the Trial Court for further action. See 
Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-4.4(c) (1985) (stating that the 
Commissioner's recommendation becomes an Order of the Court if 
not objected to within ten (10) days). 
Utah law only authorizes the Commissioner to make a 
recommendation. A recommendation becomes an Order only if both 
parties acquiesce to it and it is signed by the trial judge. In 
the event an objection is filed, the recommendation does not 
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become an order. Instead, the Trial Court must determine the 
7 issues and make an appropriate Order. 
The Commissioner customarily hears the parties1 Motions 
on arguments or proffers by counsel. The Commissioner does not 
hear testimony or afford the parties an opportunity for cross 
examination. The Commissioner followed that procedure in this 
case. 
If the Commissioner's Recommendation is considered an 
Order as binding upon the party after the party properly objects 
but prior to the Trial Court's adjudication of the issues, then 
the court has adjudicated a party's personal and property rights. 
And it has done so before the party has had an opportunity to a 
Q 
full evidentiary hearing. This scenario has been criticized by 
7 The Second Judicial District enacted a local rule that the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner's recommendation "shall 
stand pending entry of an Order of the Court encompassing 
the recommendations pending final outcome of further hearing 
before a district judge in the event objections are filed." 
See Second District Local Rule 13. 
The Fourth Judicial District issued an Order that the 
Commissioner's recommendation shall "stand pending the final 
outcome of further hearings before the district judge." 
This Order includes situations where a party files a timely 
objection. See Fourth District Local Rule 24. 
The Third Judicial District, where this case was tried, does 
not have a local rule similar to the rules of Second and 
Fourth District. As defendant will demonstrate, the Second 
and Fourth District's rules and trial court decision in this 
case violate fundamental constitutional principles. 
8 If the Trial Court followed the State statute's mandate, 
this problem would not arise. Under the statute, the Corn-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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this Court in the past. See Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 69 Utah Adv. 
Rptr. 38 (Nov. 3, 1987) (noting that this procedure deprives a 
party of his due process rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
issues involved). 
In this case, defendant properly and timely objected to 
the Commissioner's Recommendation. After that objection, defen-
g 
dant sold the stock contrary to the Recommendation. However, 
the stock was sold prior to the Trial Court's determination of 
defendant's objections. The Trial Court based its decision on 
the grounds that the Commissioner's Recommendation was a binding 
Order. In effect, the Trial Court deprived defendant of her 
right to a full hearing on the issues of temporary support and 
other related matters before the Order became effective. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Trial 
Court's Order that defendant was in contempt. This Court should 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
missioner functions as a filter because some parties will 
not object after the ten day period. This filter benefits 
the judicial system by saving time and resources. However, 
if a party objects to the recommendation, he or she may have 
a hearing at the trial court level and satisfy the parties' 
due process rights. The statute promotes both the interest 
of economy and efficiency and the interest of due process. 
9 Defendant has made a full accounting to the court of the 
proceeds received from the sale. These proceeds were gener-
ally spent for her housing and personal expenses after the 
parties separated. (R. 210-215) 
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hold that the Commissioner's recommendation does not have the 
effect of an Order when objections are timely filed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY HER OWN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES OUT OF THE PROPERTY AWARDED TO HER UPON 
DIVORCE. 
A. Introduction 
The Trial Court ordered defendant to pay her attorneys 
$20,000.00 out of the property she received upon divorce. (R. 
398) As defendant will demonstrate, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion. 
B. Application Legal Standard 
In a divorce action, the Trial Court has broad discre-
tion in awarding attorneys' fees and determining their amount. 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) (stating these 
principles). 
However, a trial court abuses its discretion when it: 
(1) orders a party to pay his or her own attorneys' fees out of 
property awarded to him or her upon divorce; see, e.g., Ierrulli 
and Ierrulli, 121 Or. App. 515, 535 P.2d 575 (1975) (Appeals 
Court refused to make the wife pay her own attorneys' fees out of 
assets she received upon divorce); and, (2) orders a party to pay 
his or her own attorney a specific sum of money, see Smith v. 
Smith, 673 P.2d 850 (Okl. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the trial 
court's order specifying the fee each party was to pay his or her 
own lawyer was an abuse of discretion). 
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C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion 
The applicable legal standard establishes the Trial 
Court abused its discretion as to its attorney's fees Order. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's Order, 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's finding and 
conclusion that the Prenuptial Agreement violates public policy. 
It should establish guidelines for determining when prenuptial 
agreements violate, or do not violate, public policy. It should 
remand to the Trial Court for factual findinas consistent with 
its opinion. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's finding 
that the Prenuptial Agreement's consideration called for "a nor-
mal marital relationship," and, that the Agreement's considera-
tion failed. It should remand to the Trial Court to make factual 
findings consistent with its interpretation of the Agreement's 
language. 
This Court should hold that the Trial Court may not 
subjectively inquire into the fairness of a prenuptial agreement. 
Instead, this Court should establish a "foreseeability under the 
circumstances" standard of review; and, remand to the Trial Court 
for findings consistent with its opinion. 
This Court should hold that the Commissioner of Domes-
tic Relations' Report and Recommendation is not binding on a 
party until the opposing party's objections are properly heard. 
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This Court should reverse the Trial Court's holding; and, remand 
for factual findings consistent with its opinion. 
This Court should hold that a trial court may not force 
a party to pay its own attorneys' fees and to specify the amount. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's holding; and, remand 
for findings consistent with its opinion. 
DATED this £ - day of June, 1988. 
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PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 25th day of 
February, 1986, by and between ALFRED J. NEILSON (hereinafter 
referred to as "ALFRED11), a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and CARLEEN COLLRAM M0FF1TT (hereinafter referred to 
as "CARLEEN11), a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement are contemplat-
ing marriage in the immediate future; and 
WHEREAS, each of the parties to this Agreement owns 
and possesses certain properties, as reflected by their books, 
accountings and documents; and 
WHEREAS, ALFRED has fully disclosed to CARLEEN the 
nature and extent of his various property interests and the 
sources of his income; and 
WHEREAS, CARLEEN has fully disclosed to ALFRED the 
nature and extent of her various property interests and the 
sources of her income; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to enter into this marriage 
settlement agreement to affirm and evidence their understandings 
relating to their separate properties, various property rights 
and other related matters, such understandings to be effective 
and binding on a permanent basis. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of each party's 
promise of marriage to the other party and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is 
hereby acknowledged, IT IS AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD AS FOLLOWS, 
to-wit: 
1. Except as set forth in this Agreement, CARLEEN 
agrees that all property and property rights, real, personal 
and mixed, of every type and description, now owned or 
possessed, or which at the time of the marriage are owned or 
possessed by ALFRED, or which shall be acquired hereafter by 
ALFRED by inheritance or otherwise, shall be and continue to 
be, during and after the marriage, the sole and separate 
property of ALFRED, and CARLEEN shall have no rights or 
interests therein. 
ADDENDUM "A" 000012 
Except as set forth in this Agreement, ALFRED agrees 
that all property and property rights, real, personal and 
mixed, of every type and description, now owned or possessed, 
or which at the time of the marriage are owned or possessed by 
CARLEEN, or which shall be acquired hereafter by CARLEEN by 
inheritance or otherwise, shall be and continue to be, during 
and after the marriage, the sole and separate property of 
CARLEEN, and ALFRED shall have no rights or interests therein. 
2. Each party hereto agrees and promises that any and 
all earnings, income, dividends, accretions, rents, issues, and 
profits arising or emanating from, or earned by or received in 
respect to, the separate property of either party hereto, shall 
be and continue to be throughout the marriage the joint marital 
property of the parties* 
3. Each party hereto agrees and promises that any and 
all salaries, bonuses or other compensatory arrangements for 
personal services, which are earned or received by either party 
during the marriage, whether retirement income or otherwise, 
shall be and continue to be throughout the marriage the joint 
marital property of the parties. 
4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, during 
the continuance of the marriage relations herein contemplated, 
each of the parties hereto is to have the full, complete and 
exclusive right to own, control and dispose of his or her 
separate property, the same as if the marriage relation did not 
exist, and each of said parties is to have the full and exclu-
sive right to dispose of and sell any and all real, personal or 
mixed property now or hereafter owned by each of said parties, 
respectively, without the other joining, and said transfer by 
either of the parties hereto shall convey the same title that 
such transfer would have conveyed had the marriage relation not 
existed. 
5. Each year during the continuance of marriage 
relations herein contemplated, the parties hereto agree to file 
joint Federal and State Income Tax Returns unless they mutually 
agree to file separate returns for such year. 
6. Each party hereto agrees that this Agreement is 
intended to limit the right of either party to participate in 
the estate of the other, whether their marriage relation is 
terminated by death or otherwise. 
7. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a 
waiver or renunciation by CARLEEN of any gift, bequest or 
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devise which may be voluntarily made to her by ALFRED, but this 
provision shall not be construed as a promise or representation 
that any such gift, bequest or devise will be made by ALFRED. 
Further, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a 
waiver or renunciation by ALFRED, of any gift, bequest or 
devise which may be voluntarily made to him by CARLEEN, but 
this provision shall not be construed as a promise or represen-
tation that any such gift, bequest or devise will be made by 
CARLEEN. 
8. Each of the parties are executing new Wills, under 
the terms of which they will each leave all of his or her 
estate to his or her surviving spouse if said surviving spouse 
survives him or her. Each of the parties hereto agree that 
they will not change the depositive provisions of their 
respective Wills during the lifetime of the other party, 
provided however, that if either party commences a divorce 
action, the other party shall then be relieved of the 
obligation under this paragraph and may then change his or her 
Will. 
9. At the time of executing this Agreement, ALFRED 
owns 25,440 shares of Texas Eastern Corporation stock. It will 
be necessary to sell certain shares of said stock to pay the 
taxes arising as a result of prior stock sales, and it may be 
necessary in the future to sell additional shares of said 
stock. Nevertheless, ALFRED agrees to transfer to CARLEEN five 
percent (5%) of said stock (or any asset into which it may be 
converted) in each year for a period of nine (9) years with the 
intention that at the end of nine (9) years, each of them will 
own an equal number of shares of said stock. On the date of 
marriage, ALFRED shall transfer to CARLEEN five percent (5%) of 
said stock. On each anniversary of their marriage thereafter, 
ALFRED will transfer the fraction of the shares then owned by 
him as indicated on the following chart: 
Anniversary Date of Marriage 
Fraction of Texas Eastern 
Shares Then Owned by Alfred 
to be Transferred to Carleen 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1/19th 
l/18th 
l/17th 
l/16th 
l/15th 
l/14th 
l/13th 
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8 l/12th 
9 1/llth or such 
lesser amount as necessary 
to give CARLEEN the same 
number of shares as ALFRED, 
xn tne event tne. parties are subsequently divorced in 
a divorce-action initiated by CARLEEN, it is understood and 
agreed that the only assets she shall be entitled to receive 
from the separate property owned by ALFRED are the shares of 
Texas Eastern Corporation stock which has theretofore been 
transferred to her* On the other hand, if the parties are 
divorced in an action initiated by ALFRED, CARLEEN shall be 
entitled to receive, as the only property to be transferred by 
the divorce to her from the separate property of ALFRED, 
sufficient shares of Texas Eastern Corporation stock so that 
she will own at the time of the divorce the same number of 
shares of said stock as will then be owned by ALFRED, 
10. In order to carry out the provisions of paragraphs 
8 and 9 above, the parties agree that, except for the sale of 
Texas Eastern Corporation stock necessary to pay income taxes 
on prior sales, there shall be no sale or exchange of shares of 
said stock by either party except upon the mutual agreement of 
both of the parties hereto. In the event shares of stock are 
sold or exchanged and the proceeds are reinvested, said 
proceeds shall be retained and separately identified and shall 
be subject to the same provisions of this and the next two 
preceding paragraphs and any new investments shall likewise not 
be sold without the consent of both parties, 
11. This Agreement is intended to be binding upon the 
parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, adminis-
trators and assigns. 
12. The parties hereto agree to sign any and all deeds, 
contracts and agreements necessary to carry out the terms of 
this agreement. 
13. The parties agree that this Agreement shall be 
subject to cancellation, termination, supplementation, amend-
ment or modification only by the execution of a writing signed 
by both parties and acknowledged in the same manner as this 
Agreement. Should either party elect to make a gift, by inter 
vivos gift or by Will, of his or her separate property (or any 
rights therein or thereto) to the other party, such gift shall 
in no way affect or change this Agreement, except and solely to 
the extent of the specific property so given. 
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14. This Agreement shall become effective only on 
consummation of the proposed marriage between the parties 
hereto, and if such marriage does not take place then this 
Agreement shall be null and void. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto 
executed'this Aateemeiit as of the date and -year first abov^ 
written. 
Alfred a./SAetLson 
^ v / 
Carleen Collram Mo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
On this 25th day of February, 1986, personally appeared 
before me, ALFRED J« NEILSON, one of the signers of the above 
and foregoing Agreement, who acknowledged that he executed the 
same. 
My Commission Expires: 
April 16, 1989 
£h 'cU j*~~t^^^ 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss, 
On this 25th day of February, 1986, personally appeared 
before me, CARLEEN COLLRAM MOFFITT, one of the signers of the 
-5-
above and foregoing Agreement, who "acknowledged that she 
executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
April 16, 1989 
6468S 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
The cases recognizing the validity of prenuptial 
agreements include: 
Dinqledine v. Dinqledine, 258 Arc. 204, 523 S.W.2d 189 
(1975); 
In Re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 131 Cal. 
Reptr. 3, 551 P.2d 323 (1976); 
Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); 
Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 349 A.2d 
712 (1976); 
Posner v. Posner, 233 So. S.2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev.'d, 
257 S.2d 530 (Fla. 1972); 
(1982); 
(1983); 
(1972); 
(1981); 
1985); 
Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662, 664 
Rossiter v. Rossiter, 4 Ha. App. 333, 666 P.2d 617 
Volid v. Volid, 6 111. App. 3d, 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 
Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 629 (1978); 
Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 
Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984); 
Rudbeck v. Rudbeck, 365 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Perry v. Perry. 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); 
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 200 N.J. Supp. 361, 491 A.2d 
752 (1985); 
Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Supp. 16, 477 A.2d 833 
(1984); 
Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St.2d 234, 431 N.E.2d 667 (1982); 
Freeman v. Freeman, 565 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1977); 
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973) 
Gant, 239 S.E.2d at 114-16; 
In Re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wa.2d 6 49, 565 P.2d 
(1977); 
Button v. Button, 126 Wis.2d 521, 378 N.W.2d 294 (1985) 
mlm:053188a 
